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Abstract
The article considers a central question about discrimination – are an actor’s intentions
relevant to whether an action wrongfully discriminates – and takes issue with a familiar
answer to this question. If one thinks of “discrimination” in its literal sense, as simply
drawing distinctions among people on the basis of possessing or lacking some trait, it
becomes clear that discrimination is ubiquitous and often benign. The challenge is to
distinguish when discrimination is permissible and when it is not. One common answer
to this question is that it is the intentions of the actor who adopts or enacts a law, policy
or decision that are crucial. Legal doctrine, both constitutional and statutory, reflects this
view by treating the actor’s intentions as centrally important. But is the moral claim on
which it rests defensible; are intentions morally relevant to whether discrimination is
wrong?
The article argues that the actor’s intent in enacting a law, adopting a policy or making a
decision is irrelevant to the moral assessment of whether the law, policy or decision
wrongfully discriminates. The article begins in Part I by drawing an analogy to a debate
in the philosophical literature about the Doctrine of Double Effect in order to press the
point that the focus on intentions confuses assessment of the wrongfulness of the action
with assessment of the moral blameworthiness of the actor. The article goes on to argue
that when we look more closely at instances of discrimination, we see that it is not the
aims of the actor that render the action wrongful, rather it is what the actor does, whether
intentional or unintentional, that matters. Parts II and III raise and reply to objections to
the arguments advanced in Part I. In particular, Part II explores the argument that the
actor’s intent is necessary to determine whether or not a law or policy distinguishes
among people on the basis of a suspect trait. Part III explores objections meant to show
that bad intentions contribute, at the very least, to rendering an action wrongful. The
article finishes by concluding that, as far as discrimination is concerned, it is not the
thought that counts.
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Introduction
In an oft-quoted passage, Justice Holmes asserts that “even a dog distinguishes
between being stumbled over and being kicked.”1 According to Fred Schauer, Holmes
overestimates dogs.2 Perhaps Holmes is wrong about people too. The passage appears to
suggest that it is the intention of the actor that determines what sort of action takes place.
The actor’s intention has the power to transform the action from an instance of kicking to
an instance of tripping. And because we assume that kicking is, generally speaking,
morally wrong while tripping is, generally speaking, not morally wrong, this
transformation is important. But this common understanding of the meaning of that
passage3 may be mistaken. After all, Holmes only needs to bother with the assertion that
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even a dog can discern the kick from the trip unless it matters what the recipient is likely
to take the action to be. The logic of the passage actually works in a way that is different
from how it is commonly interpreted: If even a dog knows the difference, then a fortiori a
person can be expected to know as well. Holmes therefore concedes that the way an
action is likely to be perceived matters to the determination of what sort of action it is and
how we ought to judge that action.
The competing claim –that intention is determinative– plays a central role in
antidiscrimination law, both Constitutional and statutory. There are two important ways
in which intention is thought to matter. First, intention may matter because it is the
actor’s intention that determines the nature of the action itself – is it kicking or tripping,
for example. Second, intention may matter to the determination of the moral or legal
permissibility of the action once defined. In antidiscrimination law, is it the thought that
counts?
This article will explore the question whether intentions ought to be relevant to
the assessment of whether a law or policy wrongfully discriminates. In exploring this
question, I will use examples both hypothetical and real. When I use case law – as
examples to test our moral intuitions – I draw more heavily on constitutional examples.
This is because the project began as an attempt at understanding the moral underpinning
of the Equal Protection Clause. However, to the extent that the argument focuses on the
normative question of the relevance of the actor’s intentions to the moral permissibility of
discrimination, its conclusions will also be relevant to discussions about how statutory
protections from discrimination ought to be crafted. To reiterate, the subject of this

as pointing to the fact that the “distinction between what an agent intends and what actually occurs is an
important feature of law generally”).
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article is unabashedly moral. It addresses the question whether intentions matter morally.
It is my hope that the answer to this question will be taken to be relevant to views about
the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause and to discussions of what statutory
protections against wrongful discrimination are warranted.
This paper will argue that the actor’s intent in enacting a law, adopting a policy or
making a decision about an individual is not relevant to the moral assessment of whether
the law, policy or decision wrongfully discriminates. While intent and intentions are
often prominent features of Equal Protection doctrine and statutory antidiscrimination
law, it is not always clear what is meant by “intentions.” The first task is therefore to
clarify what I mean by “intentions.” The actor’s intention is what he or she is aiming at.
To intend is to exercise one’s will. It is something over which the actor has control – one
does not intend inadvertently, accidentally or unconsciously. One intends intentionally.
Our intentions are the fruit of our autonomy. Intentions are different than motives as
well, though I also believe that the motives of the actor aren’t relevant to the moral
permissibility of an action either. Though the terms “intention” and “motive” are often
used synonymously, “motive” generally refers to a desire-state – that which actually
moves the actor to act.4
Intentions are not the equivalent of whatever goes on in the head of the actor.
Thus, in claiming that the actor’s intentions are not relevant to the moral question
whether a law, policy or decision wrongfully discriminates, I am not claiming that the
mental processes of the actor are irrelevant. Rather I am claiming that what she aims at,
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See e.g. Steven Sverdlik, Motives and Rightness, 106 ETHICS 327, 335(1996) (arguing that “motives
belong to the conative, desiring side of the causal story”).
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or intends to do in acting, is irrelevant. This more circumscribed claim is quite
controversial nonetheless.
The role of intention in Equal Protection doctrine and statutory antidiscrimination
law has been criticized repeatedly over the years5 and yet it has endured. I will thus
devote a significant portion of the paper to examining what I take to be the two most
important arguments for the normative importance of intentions and reply to them in
detail. First, however, I begin with the positive case for the irrelevance of the actor’s
intentions to the wrongfulness of wrongful discrimination. In Part I, I draw an analogy to
a debate in the philosophical literature about the Doctrine of Double Effect in order to
press the point that the focus on intentions in antidiscrimination law confuses assessment
of the wrongness of the action with assessment of the moral blameworthiness of the
actor. Intentions do seem relevant in many cases. The approach I propose helps to
explain this seeming relevance but recasts the relevant inquiry in objective terms. Rather
than asking what the actor intends, we ought to ask whether certain features of the law,
policy or decision violate norms of fair treatment. The explanation and defense of the
objective approach I endorse will be presented in Part I.
Parts II and III will focus on objections to the arguments advanced in Part I.
Because Larry Alexander, by himself or with co-author Kevin Cole, has been such a
thoughtful defender of the relevance of the actor’s intention to the determination of what
5

See e.g. David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935
(1989) (criticizing the discriminatory intent standard in Equal Protection doctrine); Barbara J. Flagg, “Was
Blind But Now I See: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH.
L. REV. 953 (1993) (arguing that the intent standard of Equal Protection doctrine fails to see the way in
which seemingly neutral criteria embed a white perspective); Charles R. Lawrence III. The Id, The Ego and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (arguing that
the intent standard of Equal Protection doctrine ignores “unconscious racism”). See also Linda Hamilton
Kreiger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) (arguing that Title VII’s focus on intent is
misconceived given current understandings of cognitive bias).
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constitutes wrongful discrimination, I will –with his encouragement – use his views as a
foil. Part II will explore the argument that an intent requirement is necessary in order to
know the real rule at work in a particular policy or law. Like the argument that we need
to consult the actor’s intentions to know whether we are dealing with an instance of
kicking or an instance of tripping, Alexander believes we need to consult the actor’s
intentions in order to know – at least in some cases – whether a law classifies on the basis
of a suspect trait or not. In this sense, the intention of the actor defines the nature of the
action itself.
Alternatively, one might claim that intention is relevant to the proper evaluation
of the law or policy at issue. Where a clearly invidious purpose motivates the enactment
of the law or policy, perhaps this invidious purpose (alone or combined with a bad effect)
renders a law, policy or decision impermissible. Justice Brennan articulates this view in
his 1973 opinion in U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno6 when he claims that “if the
constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the
very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest .”7 Part III will thus examine
whether invidious intent ought to be relevant to our evaluation of whether a law, policy or
individual decision is wrongful.
One caveat before beginning. Taking to heart the changes in law review culture
as evidenced in the new preference for shorter articles, this article addresses itself to the
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413 U.S. 528 (1973) (striking down a provision of a federal food stamp program that limited assistance to
households of “related” persons” on the grounds that the statutory limitation was unrelated to the goals of
the program (to raise nutritional levels of poor households and to support agriculture) and because there
was evidence in the legislative history suggesting that the classification had been inserted to keep hippies
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7
413 U.S. at 534 (emphasis added).

6

reader familiar with antidiscrimination law – constitutional as well as statutory. It
therefore does not open with a descriptive section whose aim would be to document the
ways in which intention continues to play an important role in current antidiscrimination
law. The few examples from the case law below are meant as illustrations only, to direct
the reader’s attention to the sorts of cases and issues this article will address. They are
not offered as proof that intent continues to be relevant in our law. What follows in Parts
I, II and III are the arguments addressed to the question whether intent ought to be
relevant that will, I hope, add to our understanding of what makes discrimination wrong.

Part I: The Case Against Intention
Are the actor’s intentions necessary to define or to evaluate whether a law, policy
or decision “discriminates?” I put the term “discrimination” in scare quotes because
there is an important ambiguity in the term itself that we must disambiguate before
proceeding. The term “discrimination” can be used in a descriptive or a moralized way.
Descriptively, to “discriminate” is merely to draw distinctions among people on the basis
of the presence or absence of some trait. For example, the requirement that one must be
16 to drive discriminates between people under 16 and those 16 and over. The
requirement that you must pass the bar exam to practice law discriminates between bar
passers and non-bar passers, etc. When the term “discrimination” is used in a moralized
way, it means to wrongfully draw such distinctions. For example, the requirement that
group homes for the mentally disabled must seek zoning variances while other group
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homes need not wrongfully discriminates between the mentally disabled and others.8 In
order to avoid confusion about which sense of discrimination I am discussing at any
particular time I will avoid the terms “discriminate” or “discrimination” altogether.
Instead, when I have in mind the descriptive sense of discrimination, I will instead say
that the law, policy or decision “classifies on the basis of” X trait – or something similar.
When I have in mind the moralized sense of discrimination, I will say that the law, policy
or decision “wrongfully discriminates” so that the moralized aspect is explicit.

Part I.A:

Intention and Identification

With that clarification in place, let’s turn to the first question above: do we need
to know the actor’s intentions in order to identify whether a law or policy classifies on the
basis of some particular trait? Here, it is the descriptive sense of discrimination that is
relevant. The idea behind the claim that intentions are determinative here is that
classifying itself is an intentional act; that one can only classify intentionally. Is that so?
There is a large body of psychological scholarship extensively summarized by
Linda Hamilton Krieger9 that suggests that it is not. Briefly she claims that “because
race, ethnicity, and gender have been made salient by our history and by observable
patterns of economic, demographic, and political distribution, people will continue to
categorize along these lines”10 and therefore, “we can expect the resulting categorizationrelated distortions in social perception and judgment to bias intergroup
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This example clearly is derived from the case of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432
(1985) (striking down a municipal ordinance that required special use permits for homes for the mentally
retarded that were not required for other group homes).
9
Krieger, supra note 5.
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Id. at 1239-40.
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decisionmaking.”11 While the extent of cognitive bias may be subject to dispute – and is
surely something about which I have no expertise – it is hard to imagine that someone
could deny the possibility of the sort of unconscious distortions in perception and
judgment that Krieger describes. And, if unconscious bias is possible, what ought we to
say about it? If a stereotype about gender, for example, affects the way that an employer
makes sense of the data about a particular employee, then gender is – almost by definition
– affecting the decision-making process. The employer is classifying on the basis of
gender, just not consciously or deliberately. Once we strip the normative evaluation from
our understanding of the descriptive inquiry, it is clear than unconscious classification is
not only possible but is likely to be prevalent.
Another way to approach the question of whether one can classify unintentionally
is to ask a more general question about what sorts of actions can only be done
intentionally. After all, the claim that one must consult the actor’s intentions in order to
determine if she is classifying on the basis of a particular trait amounts to the claim that
classification is the sort of action that can only be done intentionally. First, we should
note that the claim that there is a gap between intentions and actions is uncontroversial.
The fact that one intends to do a particular action doesn’t guarantee that the intended
action will occur. This is true of mundane actions: the fact that I intend to write a
persuasive article surely will not ensure that this article is indeed persuasive. And it is
true about classification. I may intend to classify on the basis of ability, let’s say, but
may not succeed in doing so for any number of reasons.
But what of the opposite direction? Here too, it is commonly the case that the
nature of the action doesn’t depend on the intentions of the actor. I can kill someone
11

Id. at 1240.
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without intending to. I can shoot a basket or hurt your feelings without intending to.
However, there are some actions where the actor’s intentions seem constitutive. Perhaps
one can only murder intentionally. And Holmes’ kick distinguishes itself from the trip by
virtue of the actor’s intentions. Is classification like either of these examples? I think
not. Murder is a moralized concept; it is to kill wrongfully where part of what makes it
wrongful derives from the culpable mental state of the actor. Kicking is also a
misleading example. Sometimes kicking means no more than “to strike out with the foot
or feet, as in anger, or in swimming, dancing, etc.”12 This sort of kicking need not be
done intentionally; surely the best dancing is done more by instinct. However, when
what we mean by “kick” is to strike with the foot intentionally, then this is just part of the
way we are using the word – as a sort of short hand for “kick with the foot intentionally.”
If so, this does not suggest anything deep about kicking, it is just to say that we can use
the work kick to mean intentionally striking.
There may well be other sorts of actions that can only be done intentionally, but
why think classification is one of them? Rather, there are good reasons to think it is not.
Orchestras use a screen to audition musicians in order to protect against the sort of
cognitive bias that Krieger describes. If you are the orchestra director and aware of the
phenomenon of cognitive bias, and thus on guard against it, why still use a screen? A
well-motivated director might choose to use a screen because it is so hard to avoid these
errors in perception and judgment. Cognitive bias is hard to root out because it is so easy
to classify unintentionally. Not only is classification not one of the unusual sorts of
actions that can only be done intentionally, it is the sort of action that is often and easily
done unintentionally.
12
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Part I.B.

Intention and Evaluation

If the actor’s intentions do not determine whether a law, policy or decision
classifies on the basis of a particular trait, perhaps the actor’s intentions determine if this
classification is wrongful. This claim seems more promising. While intentions may not
determine whether an actor classifies on the basis of race or sex, for example, perhaps her
intentions matter to the determination of whether this classification constitutes wrongful
discrimination. It is that claim I will address here. I want to do so however a bit
circuitously. The claim that an actor’s intentions can affect whether or not an action is
permissible or impermissible plays a prominent role in what is known in the
philosophical literature as the Doctrine of Double Effect [DDE]. This doctrine – and the
claim that underlies it – has generated significant controversy. Because much of the
debate focuses on whether the actor’s intentions can determine the wrongfulness of the
action, a closer look at that debate may be useful here.
According to the Doctrine of Double Effect, actions that will cause harm are
sometimes wrong and sometimes not depending on whether the harm is intended or
instead merely foreseen. The DDE originates in Catholic Just War doctrine, and thus the
example most often used to illustrate it in the secular, philosophical literature is the
wartime contrast between the strategic bomber and the terror bomber.13 The strategic
bomber intends to bomb a legitimate military target (a munitions factory, for example)
but foresees that in doing so nearby civilians will also be killed. The terror bomber, by
contrast, intends to kill civilians. In order to make the cases equivalent except for the
difference in the actor’s intentions, the example generally supposes that the war is a just
13

See e.g. WARREN QUINN, MORALITY AND ACTION (1993) at 177.
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war, the same number of civilians will die in each case, and the probability that the
civilians will die is also the same in both cases. According to the DDE, the strategic
bombing is morally permissible while the terror bombing is not – an intuition that is
supposed to be widely shared – because the strategic bomber does not intend for the
civilians to die, he merely foresees that they will while the terror bomber intends the
death of the civilians. As Judith Thomson restates the doctrine (which she calls the
Principle of Double Effect [PDE]), “PDE tells us that if the good effect of the act is
proportionately good enough, then an agent may morally permissibly perform the act if,
while foreseeing the bad effect, he intends only the good effect and does not intend the
bad one, either as an end (i.e., for its own sake) or as a means to the good effect.”14
Because the strategic bomber does not intend for the civilians to die either as an end in
itself (because their deaths would demoralize the enemy, say) or as a means to some other
end, bombing the munitions factory is permissible. The death of the civilians is truly
collateral damage – a regrettable side effect of the legitimate aim. The terror bomber by
contrast aims to kill the civilians. Because his intention is to bring about their deaths, his
action is impermissible.
A second and more controversial example in which the DDE is used to explain
and justify a supposed moral difference between a pair of cases can be found in the area
of physician-assisted suicide. Here critics of assisted suicide insist on the importance of
the distinction between injecting drugs to hasten death and merely refusing life-sustaining
treatment. While most of the disagreement in this area focuses on the important and
often related distinction between doing and allowing or in this area specifically between

14

Judith Jarvis Thomson, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Two Moral Arguments, ETHICS 109 (April 1999):
497-518 at 510.
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killing and allowing to die, there are some cases to which the doing/allowing distinction
is inapt and the intending/foreseeing distinction more promising. In particular, critics of
the moral (and legal) permissibility of assisted suicide often want to draw a distinction
between injecting drugs to bring about death and injecting drugs to provide pain relief,
where the amount or type of medication required to provide sufficient palliation will
predictably bring about death (often called “terminal sedation”). To those for whom
these cases are meaningfully morally different, this difference can be accounted for using
the DDE. In the case of injecting drugs to bring about death, the actor’s intention is to
kill the patient. By contrast, in the terminal sedation cases, the aim of the actor is to
relieve the patient’s suffering. The death of the patient, while a foreseeable consequence
of injecting the palliative drug, is thus merely a consequence of a legitimate goal.
Justice Rehnquist relied on precisely this account in explaining why the decision
in Vacco v. Quill15 sustaining the New York law forbidding assisted suicide would not
thereby make terminal sedation illegal. He began by asserting that the legal system in
general uses an actor’s intentions as a way to distinguish between actions.16 In support of
this claim, he relied on examples from criminal law in which the actor’s state of mind
determines the level of offense17 and, perhaps because Vacco is an Equal Protection case,
on that doctrine’s insistence that drawing distinctions among people is only
impermissible when a policy is adopted “because of” and not merely “’in spite of’ their
unintended but foreseen consequences.”18 Drawing explicitly on the DDE, Rehnquist
15

521 U.S. 793, 802-809 (1997).
Id. at 802 (asserting that “[t]he law has long used actors’ intent or purpose to distinguish between two
acts that may have the same result”).
17
Id.
18
Id. at 802-3 (citing Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (upholding a
Massachusetts law which accorded veterans an “absolute lifetime” preference in civil service jobs). The
law was challenged on the ground that because the class of veterans was overwhelmingly male, the law
16
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argued that terminal sedation is meaningfully different from assisted suicide because the
state “may permit palliative care related to that refusal [of medical treatment], which may
have the foreseen but unintended ‘double effect’ of hastening the patient’s death.”19
Judith Thomson, a critic of the DDE’s insistence that it is the actor’s intentions
that matter morally, hypothesizes that the reason that many people continue to believe
that intent ought to be relevant (in the cases she examines and in the doctrine of double
effect literature more generally) is that they confuse a judgment of the actor with a
judgment about the action. As Thomson puts it, “a failure to take seriously enough the
fact – I think it is plainly a fact – that the question whether it is morally permissible for a
person to do a thing is just not the same as the question whether the person who does it is
thereby shown to be a bad person.”20 To illustrate this point, consider the following
example – drawn from Thomson. Suppose an ill patient is in terrible pain. In addition,
suppose there is a drug [D] that will relieve the patient’s suffering. The doctor treating
this patient mistakenly believes that in order to provide enough of D to get the patient’s
pain under control, D will kill the patient. Actually, D is not very toxic and can be taken
in large quantities without any significant ill effects. In addition to being somewhat
incompetent, the doctor is also nefarious. The patient is a former colleague of his of
whom he was always jealous. As a result, the doctor would like to kill the patient and
intends to do so under the cover of providing palliative care (or so he thinks). The doctor
constituted unlawful sex discrimination. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, held that
“’Discriminatory purpose,’” however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of
consequences. It implies that the decision-maker, in this case a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a
particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,” its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group.” Id.
19
521 U.S. at 807, note 11.
20
Thomson, supra note 14 at 517. Tim Scanlon endorses a similar view. See T. M. Scanlon, Intention and
Permissibility, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Soc. Sup. Vol. 74 (2000), 301-317 at 306 (agreeing “with
Thomson that this confusion involves a failure to distinguish clearly between features that make an action
wrong and description of the flaw that an agent exhibits in performing it”).

14

is clearly a bad person. His bad intention (to kill the colleague of whom he is jealous)
makes our judgment of him an easy case. Less clear is what we should say about the
moral permissibility of the action. If intentions matter to determining the permissibility
of actions, then we have a strong reason to conclude that the doctor ought not to give the
patient the drug. Not only that, we have a strong reason to conclude that another doctor
can do the very same act – giving this patient this drug – that the first doctor may not do.
These conclusions do not seem right. While the doctor ought not to have the intention he
has and is thereby shown to be a bad person, giving the patient the drug is nonetheless the
right thing to do. Providing palliation without adverse consequences, which this drug
will do, is what the doctor ought to do for his patient.21
Thomson’s example, while persuasive, may not be exactly on point as the factors
that affect whether the physician ought to give the drug are plausibly all external to the
mind of the actor: whether the patient has consented, whether the patient is in pain, etc.
When we are evaluating whether an actor wrongfully classifies, this is not necessarily the
case. While some factors that may affect whether this classification is wrongful are
external to the mind of the actor (like the effect of doing so), others are not. Another way
to put this point is to note that in classification cases, there is often no single right
outcome (analogous to giving the patient the drug). Rather, several policies or decisions
are permissible if adopted for permissible reasons. This fact – that it is reasons that are
permissible or forbidden – appears to make the actor’s intentions crucial.22
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Thomson discusses this same example. See Thomson, supra note 14 at 516 (arguing that the fact that
the doctor will inject the drug for a bad reason “matters morally, not by way of fixing that it is morally
impermissible for her to proceed, rather by showing something morally bad about her”).
22
This is the view of Larry Alexander, which will be discussed in depth in Part II below.
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The fact that reasons are central to the determination of whether a decision or
policy is permissible need not indicate however that the actor’s intentions determine
whether an action is wrongful. Here again an analogy to the DDE literature is
illuminating. Tim Scanlon, like Judith Thomson, argues against the view that the
difference in the actor’s intentions explains the difference between the typically paired
cases in the DDE literature. In order to explain Scanlon’s account, a little background is
necessary. For Scanlon, a moral principle contains within it a specification of the reasons
that count as exceptions to it. If we follow the principle, we take the reasons that count as
exceptions to the general statement as guides to action. If we fail to take these reasons as
guides to actions (i.e. act with different intentions) we act wrongly. But, as Scanlon
explains, “what makes our action wrong is not the reason on which acted (i.e. our
intention) but, rather, the feature of the action and its circumstances that the principle
identifies as decisive reasons against it.”23 Scanlon provides the following example,
which clarifies the rather subtle distinction he is making.
Suppose that I have promised to do something, and that under the
circumstances this counts as a decisive reason for doing it. In particular,
the fact that I could benefit financially from breaking the promise is not a
sufficient reason to fail to keep it. But suppose I break it anyway, in order
to get this benefit. In describing what was defective about my action, you
might say that I acted wrongly in taking my own advantage as sufficient
reason to break my promise. But, at a more fundamental level, what made
my action wrong was not the reason I acted on but the reason counting
against so acting. The act was wrong because the fact that I promised
made it the case, under the circumstances, that I should do the thing in
question.24
An analogous account can explain the wrongfulness of wrongful discrimination
cases as well. Suppose an employer prefers white candidates. He consciously

23
24

Scanlon, supra note 20 at 311 (emphasis added).
Id.
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and deliberately chooses white candidates over candidates of color. Following
Scanlon’s account, what makes this wrong is not the fact that the employer
intends to hire whites. Rather, what makes the action wrong is that skin color
ought not to be a factor affecting the hiring decision. It is not the intention that is
relevant, rather it is the fact that the race of the job candidate affects a decision
when it should not.25
Now pair this account with Krieger account of cognitive bias. In the
above section, we established that people classify on the basis of race, sex or other
traits without intending to. In other words, race or sex based traits influence
decision-making without cognitive awareness. And, if what makes an action
wrong is the fact that race is playing a role it ought not to play, then what makes
such an action wrong is not the actor’s intentions but the objective fact that racial
categorization played a role in the decision-making that it ought not to have
played.
It is important to pause over this point because it is this sort of case that is
at the root of the view that intention must be relevant to the evaluation of claims
of wrongful discrimination. Most people agree that where an action is morally
required, tossing the life preserver to the drowning person, for example, the action
25

It might be tempting to draw the analogy even more closely to Scanlon’s and argue that what makes the
hiring decision wrong is that a particular job applicant objectively ought to be hired. This is a mistake
however. In the context of jobs or places at schools, it is not the case that particular candidates are entitled
to those spots. The employer or school can choose whichever applicants it wishes. Rather, morally as well
as legally, the employer or school is merely proscribed from basing its decision on certain characteristics in
certain contexts or in certain ways. While the issue of affirmative action shows the complexity of spelling
out when or in what context race may be a legitimate criterion in job selection or school admission, it is
probably safe to say that an employer or school may not disfavor minority applicants on the basis of race.
In this article, I do not provide the basis for this moral judgment – which would be necessary for a complete
account of wrongful discrimination – rather I hope to build on what I take to be a widely shared moral
view. Taking as the starting point then that the use of race to disadvantage a minority applicant is wrong,
an employer who does so acts wrongly not because she intends to disadvantage the minority applicant but
because she uses race in her decision-making in a way she should not.
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is right whether one does it in order to save the person or in the hope of a reward.
Discrimination seems different however. This is because wrongful discrimination
often occurs in contexts where no one particular action is required. In the
employment context, often no one particular person is clearly the best qualified,
for example. In such cases, it often seems that what is forbidden therefore is
acting with a particular intention (hire only whites) or from a particular motive
(racism). Scanlon’s insight – although it does not deal with a case of multiple
permissible actions – exposes the confusion behind this intuition. Although
multiple actions are permissible, some actions – properly described – are
forbidden.
Steven Sverdlik, arguing in a similar vein as Alexander for the moral
relevance of the actor’s motives,26 thinks that discrimination presents one of the
kinds of cases in which motivation has moral significance. He uses the example
of a seller who refuses to sell his house to a prospective buyer because the buyer
is black. Sverdlik believes that because the seller could refuse to sell to the buyer
for other reasons (lack of credit worthiness, for example) or to take his house off
the market altogether (because he has second thoughts and decides to keep the
house) and thus is not obligated to sell his house to this would-be buyer, it must
be the case that the actor’s motives make the moral difference – turning a morally
permissible action (refusing to sell for the two later reasons) into a morally wrong
action (refusing to sell because the buyer is black). But is it really the actor’s
motives that matter?

26

Sverdlik, supra note 4 at 341-9.
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Where multiple actions are permissible – selling or refusing to sell to this
buyer, for example – reasons do matter but let’s look more closely at how they
matter. What is morally impermissible is for the race of the buyer to affect the
seller’s decision. Thus the seller may decide to sell or not to sell for a myriad of
permissible reasons but he may not refuse to sell to the buyer because of the
buyer’s race. If the buyer’s race affects the seller’s decision, a wrong has
occurred. If motives are a species of desire and intentions are a product of the
will, then neither motives nor intentions matter in that it doesn’t matter whether
the actor desires or is motivated by race nor whether he intends or wills that race
play a role in his decision-making process. What matters is whether indeed the
race of the buyer was a factor in his decision, whether he wanted it to be or
intended it to be or not. If race played such a role, the action is wrongful.
Intending is an act of will. The claim that one must intend to wrongfully
discriminate in order to do so maintains that to classify wrongfully one must be intending
to do so. But if one can classify unintentionally, why think that wrongful classification
requires an intent to classify? This view confuses a judgment of the actor with a
judgment of the action, in the way that Thomson describes. The wrongfulness of the
action isn’t a statement about the virtue of the actor; it is a statement about the action.
While this article has not articulated a positive account of what – rather than bad
intentions – renders a classification morally problematic, very roughly it seems plausible
to say that wrongful discrimination fails to treat people with equal concern or fails to
provide fair treatment, or something of this nature. Here what is emphasized is the
treatment people receive. In other words, the argument against the importance of the
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actor’s intentions breaks the link between the actor’s autonomy and the wrongfulness of
the action. Sometimes we treat people unfairly even though we do not mean to do so.
Often, it’s not the thought that counts.

Part II: Is Intention Necessary to Identify the Classifying Trait?
Larry Alexander offers an argument against the view I present above. He believes
that the actor’s intention is necessary in order to know what sort of action one is dealing
with in the first place. His complex and challenging article Rules, Rights, Options and
Time27, in which he lays out his argument for this view, thus presents a useful foil. In
what follows below, I will briefly describe Alexander’s argument and then reply to it.
Alexander argues (adopting Matt Adler’s conception of constitutional rights as
rights against rules28) that there are many constitutionally permissible rules that have the
effect of excluding people. For example, the rule “the pool is now closed” excludes those
who want to swim now.29 (I use and build on this example because it is one that
Alexander discusses.) In addition, he argues that it is also permissible for a state actor to
change his or her mind about which of these constitutionally permissible rules to adopt.
For example, “pool open” and “pool closed” are both constitutionally permissible rules.
However, if different rules impact different groups of people adversely, then switching

27

Larry Alexander, Rules, Rights, Options, and Time, LEGAL THEORY 6 (2000), 391-404.
See Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97
U. MICH. L. REV. 1 (1998).
29
I don’t intent to myself adopt a view about whether Adler’s conception of constitutional rights as rights
against rules is correct, nor does Alexander. Nonetheless Alexander’s point that many constitutionally
permissible rules exclude people is surely correct – however one conceives of constitutional rights. This
fact – which one might call the discrimination conundrum – was first articulated by Tussman and tenBroek
in their classic article The Equal Protection of the Laws. See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949). In order to accomplish a myriad of both
important and mundane tasks, laws and policies must draw distinctions among people (must “discriminate”
– to use that term without its normal pejorative connotations).
28
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between constitutionally permissible rules in a calculated manner may produce troubling
results.
For example, suppose the person in charge of determining when the town pool is
open or closed opens the pool when he sees a group of white patrons approaching and
closes the pool when he sees a group of black patrons approaching. Alexander argues
that here the real rule is that whites may swim and blacks may not. In his view, “[i]t is
the operative rule for constitutional assessment.”30 And, and here’s the key claim, the
only way to know that this is the real rule is by looking to the actor’s intention: “the
purpose essentially defines the real rule that must be constitutionally evaluated.”31 While
the term “purpose” itself may be ambiguous – purpose may refer to the subjective
motivation of the actor or purpose may refer to the best understanding of the policy’s
aim, viewed objectively – Alexander is clear that it is the internal motivation of the actor
that for him is key. Alexander’s analysis requires that a court make a determination
about the content of the actor’s mental state. He says repeatedly that it is motivation that
matters32 and emphasizes the reasons for which a policy was adopted.33 In other words, it
is the actual motivation of the actor, the reasons he adopted a policy, that count rather
than the reasons that support a policy being adopted.
This is an important argument. If indeed we need motivation analysis to
distinguish this case from instances of benign switching between constitutionally
permissible rules, then Alexander is right and it is the thought that counts. But we do not.

30

Alexander supra note 27 at 400.
Id.
32
Id. (arguing that “[g]iven constitutional optionality and the permissibility of switching, the courts must
treat legislative motivation as material).
33
Id. at 400-01 (claiming that “it is material whether they [laws] were enacted for reasons that were also
constitutionally optional as opposed to constitutionally forbidden”).
31
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Below I present two arguments against Alexander’s contention that motivation analysis is
necessary to identify cases like the one he describes above.
Before doing so, however, it is important to clarify Alexander’s position.
Alexander claims that the “purpose essentially defines the real rule.”34 In other words,
we need to look to purpose to know what the rule is because intentions are constitutive of
the action. This view should not be confused with a more modest epistemological claim.
Someone might believe that whether or not a person classifies on the basis of race, sex or
some other trait is determined independently of that person’s intentions and yet believe
that consulting the actor’s intentions is a fairly good way to find out about the real nature
of the action. If people generally do what they intend to do, this may well be reasonable.
Nor should Alexander’s view be confused with a doctrinal claim: that an intent-based test
reaches the right result (where rightness is defined independently) more often than any
plausible alternative.35 Alexander’s claim about the relation between intentions and
classification is far more basic and constitutive.

Part I.A. Intention Is Neither Necessary Nor Sufficient
Alexander argues that we need intention analysis to determine what he terms the
“metarule” (here, that whites may swim but blacks may not). The first point to note
about Alexander’s argument is that it is circular. He assumes that the real rule is what the
actor intends. That is why he tells us that the lifeguard has been instructed to display the
pool open sign when whites arrive and the pool closed sign when blacks arrive. But if the
34

Id. at 400.
See e.g. the distinction between constitutional “operative propositions” and “decision rules” proposed by
Mitchell Berman, Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004)
(distinguishing “operative propositions” which elucidate constitutional meaning from “decision rules”
which allow courts to apply that meaning).
35
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example is offered as an argument for why intentions are relevant, we must start from a
place that does not yet make any assumptions about what the real rule is.36 A fairer way
to present the issue would be to consider the following three scenarios and then ask
oneself whether intentions matter as Alexander supposes.
Scenario 1: A lifeguard on duty displays the sign “pool open” when whites arrive to
swim and the sign “pool closed” when blacks arrive to swim.
Scenario 2: Same as above, plus the lifeguard is switching the rule in order to keep
blacks out.
Scenario 3: Same as 1, plus the lifeguard is not switching the rule in order to keep blacks
out.
If no other plausible explanation is offered (as Alexander’s example assumes), the rule in
all three cases may be the same. There are two points here. First, we don’t need to know
the actor’s intentions to define the meta-rule. Sometimes it is determined from what
takes place. Second, the real rule can be different from what the actor intends. In
Scenario 3, notwithstanding the fact that the actor may not be racially motivated, if he
consistently opens the pool for whites and closes it for blacks, then the real rule just is
that the pool is open for whites but not for blacks. The more persistent the pattern, the
clearer this is.
In making this claim, am I thereby endorsing disparate impact as the test for what
the rule is – and thus for what counts as wrongful discrimination? Yes and no. Yes, in
that on the analysis I offer, it is the objective features of the action, law or policy that
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To be clear, let me explain the relationship between Alexander’s term “real rule” and the vocabulary I
have been using: classifying on the basis of X trait and wrongfully discriminating. When Alexander asks
what the real rule is, he is asking about X. In other words, he is interested in the descriptive sense of
discrimination, about classifying on the basis of X trait but he is raising a question about what is the X on
the basis of which the classification is made. To identify the “real rule” is to find the X on the basis of
which the rule classifies.
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matter and disparate impact is one such objective feature. But no, in that this approach
does not commit me to the view that disparate impact is the only or indeed the central
objective feature that matters. Indeed, even under an intent-based approach disparate
impact is relevant as evidence of subjective intent. In my view, disparate impact is
evidence of objective meaning. The Supreme Court’s disparate impact cases suggest that
impact alone cannot be sufficient to establish intent – though it is unclear, at least
theoretically, why not. On my view, disparate impact alone could establish the objective
meaning of the law but in the kinds of cases that have come before the Court – like
Washington v. Davis,37 -- there is other important objective evidence that cuts in the other
direction. For example, the fact that there are good reasons to test police officers for the
skills the test in question evaluated is relevant to the objective meaning of the law. Note
that I am not suggesting one ask whether these reasons actually motivated the police in
adopting the test.
So far, I have argued that objective features of the law or policy in question
permit us to determine what the real rule is and thus that intention analysis is not
necessary. The example we have focused on (pool open when whites arrive and closed
when blacks arrived) presented a fairly unambiguous case where the objective indicia
pointed clearly to the real rule: whites may swim but blacks may not. Alexander might
respond to this critique by pressing a more ambiguous case. Consider the following
example, drawn from another excellent and thought-provoking article by Larry
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426 U.S. 229 (1976) (rejecting a challenge to the use of a written test in hiring decisions for the D.C.
Police Department on the grounds that the fact that the test had a disparate impact on African-American job
seekers was not sufficient to shift the burden to the Police Force to show that the test was a good predictor
of job performance).
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Alexander (here with Kevin Cole).38 A hypothetical state supported law school in the
plain states adopts a policy of favoring regional applicants. It does so however because
this policy will decrease minority enrollment, which the school would like to do because
it turns out that the LSAT overpredicts the performance of minority applicants (these are
the facts assumed by Alexander and Cole in their examples). By decreasing the number
of minority students admitted, the law school will thereby enhance the performance of its
students.39
Two questions are raised by this hypothetical. First, is Alexander right that the
real rule here is “limit minority applicants” (as an intent analysis might suggest) rather
than “prefer local applicants”? If we don’t assume that the intention defines the real rule,
it is not at all clear that the real rule is “limit minorities.” It is important to distinguish the
rule from the motive for adopting the rule. A more natural way to describe this case
would be to say that the rule is “prefer local applicants” but that the motive for adopting
the rule is to limit minority applicants (in order to boost overall student performance).
Where the objective features of the policy do not manifest the internal subjective
motivation, to say that the real rule is defined by the subjective motivation is to merely
assert his view and at the cost of some fairly counter-intuitive formulations.
The second question raised by this example is more serious. If the rule “prefer
local applicants” is adopted in order to limit the enrollment of minority students, does this
reason itself provide grounds for holding the policy impermissible? This issue – whether
problematic subjective intentions are relevant to the evaluation of a law, policy or
decision will be considered in Part III below.

38
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Larry Alexander and Kevin Cole, Discrimination by Proxy, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 453 (1997).
This is the School C that Alexander and Cole describe, see Alexander and Cole, supra note 38 at 454.
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Part II.B.

Facial Discrimination, Disparate Impact and Subjective Intent

Subjective intention matters for Alexander in order to determine the real rule. By
this he means that intention is necessary to determine whether a law or policy classifies
on a suspect basis or not. Alexander is not interested in the motive for classifying (in the
way that affirmative action is often described as benign discrimination). Rather he is
only interested in using subjective intention to determine whether the real rule is one that
classifies on a suspect basis or not (for whatever reason). As a result, for Alexander there
is a fairly firm line between disparate treatment and disparate impact cases.40 Disparate
treatment cases are not Alexander’s focus, presumably because in these laws or policies,
the fact that the law classifies is manifest and thus inquiry into subjective intent
unnecessary. But can Alexander distinguish between disparate impact and disparate
treatment cases in this hard and fast way and cabin the use of subjective intent analysis to
disparate impact cases?
To examine this question, let’s look a bit more closely at how Alexander detects
the “real rule” at work in disparate impact cases. In discussing policies adopted at
California universities to promote diversity in the wake of proposition 209 (which
prohibits race based affirmative action), Alexander says the following:
Administrators who select facially nonracial admissions criteria ‘in order
to promote racial diversity’ are not avoiding the law but are violating it.
They are choosing close proxies for race for racial reasons, and we must
assume that if the reasons remain constant over time, the proxies will
change if necessary. … The real rule is ‘admit so as to promote racial
diversity,’ which is forbidden.41

40

Alexander’s focus is on disparate impact cases largely as he sees these as the sites of the sorts of
conceptual puzzles he finds both troubling and illuminating.
41
Alexander, supra note 27 at 33.
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In order to determine the real rule, Alexander looks to the subjective intent. If a
university wants to admit some percentage of minority applicants but is forbidden from
explicitly classifying on the basis of race, the school might instead adopt a facially
neutral policy like “admit the top 10% of all high school graduates.” Alexander claims
that this policy is a racial classification itself. This is the odd and strongly counterintuitive implication of his view that I highlighted in the previous section. On what basis
does he determine that this is the real rule, notwithstanding the objective evidence
provided by the policy itself? He determines that the real rule is “admit so as to promote
racial diversity” because over time the proxies used to achieve this goal will change. In
other words, because the top 10% rule is likely to be retained only so long as it serves the
diversity goal, we ought to conclude that the real rule is “admit to promote racial
diversity” rather than “admit top 10%.”
However, this same analysis can be used to show that rational race or sex
discrimination isn’t actually race or sex discrimination at all. For example, suppose a
state employer refused to hire women because in general women decline to work the long
hours that are required by the jobs in question. Here sex is being used as a proxy for
willingness to work long hours.42 Is this policy an instance of discrimination on the basis
of sex? Alexander’s analysis would seem to suggest that the answer is no. Like in the
example explored above, one cannot simply look at the face of the rule or policy, rather
one must discover the “real rule.” To do so, according to Alexander one looks at
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Interestingly, this is the first reason offered by Harvard President Lawrence Summers to explain the
under-representation of women as tenured professors in the sciences as well as in other demanding jobs in
his remarks at the National Bureau of Economic Research [NBER] Conference on Diversifying the Science
& Engineering Workforce that created so much controversy due to the second reason he offered (innate
differences in abilities between men and women). See
www.president.harvard.edu/speeches/2005/nber.html.
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subjective intent. In particular, one looks at whether “the proxy will change as
necessary” to accommodate the underlying purpose. In the case of rational sex
discrimination (or rational race discrimination), the underlying purpose is to hire the most
cost effective worker. Alexander’s analysis would therefore imply that the real rule is
“don’t hire people unwilling to work long hours” rather than “don’t hire any women.” As
such, this is simply not a case of sex discrimination at all.
Alexander’s analysis fuses the normative question of whether the discrimination
is permissible with the interpretive question of what sort of classification is being used
(i.e. what the “real rule” is – to use his terms). To argue that an employer’s refusal to hire
women because in general women are unwilling to work long hours is not gender
discrimination seems just plain wrong. If the rationality of the classification matters –
which it does to some commentators and not to others – surely it relates to the moral or
legal permissibility of the classification not to whether this is a gender classification at
all.
The laws and policies at issue in disparate treatment cases are often described as
“facially” discriminatory. This term is illuminating. The claim that a law or policy is
facially discriminatory is to emphasize that objective features of the law (its text) are
what matter in determining what the real law is. The objective evidence tells us both
what the real rule is and provides the material on the basis of which to evaluate its
permissibility. Alexander is right to point out that the facial evidence (meaning what the
law or policy directs on its face) is not always dispositive. When we claim that the law is
facially discriminatory, we are really saying that the facial evidence outweighs other
evidence. But what other evidence would it make sense for it to outweigh? If evidence
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of subjective mental state could trump the facial evidence, we are left with the puzzle of
why it doesn’t trump it in cases of rational race or sex discrimination. If however, facial
evidence is one type of objective evidence that together illuminate the “real rule,” then
when we conclude that a law discriminates based on the facial evidence, we are saying
that no other objective evidence of contradicts or overcomes the important facial
evidence of what the law really is.
To summarize the points discussed thus far: first, intention is not necessary to
identify the real rule at work in a law. Objective evidence will suffice to identify
troubling cases. Neither is it sufficient. The pattern of rule switching that is motivated
by an intent to keep Blacks out is not necessarily different from one that is not. To insist
that it is different is not really to make a claim about the need to consult intentions to
identify the rule a work but instead to make a claim about the how one ought to evaluate a
rule that is motivated by bad reasons – a claim that will be explored and evaluated in Part
III below. Second, the claim that one needs to look at subjective intent in order to
discover the “real rule” leads to the counter-intuitive conclusion that facially
discriminatory laws that discriminate rationally (and perhaps others) do not really classify
on the basis of sex or race. On this view, the real rule is defined by the proxy’s target
(hire the most productive employee, for example). This account seems wrongheaded.
Either subjective intent matters in both disparate treatment and disparate impact cases to
determine what the real rule is, which leads to unsupportable conclusions or objective
evidence determines the real rule in both types of case.

Part II.C.

Private Bias
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One kind of case continues to be troubling to the account I have provided – the
sort of case in which the actor uses race or sex (or something else troubling) as a criterion
in a way that eludes detection. Imagine that an employer follows the policy of hiring the
candidate she judges to be the best qualified but in cases of ties, hires the white job
seeker. Because the employer only uses race to break ties, the manifestation of this
policy may not suggest that race has played a role. Another employer for whom race was
not a factor could easily have chosen to hire the same applicants as the first employer, but
for other reasons. It seems that we should say about this example that the “real rule” is
that race played a role in the selection process. In order to do so, however, must we
consult the actor’s intentions, as Alexander supposes?
In order to answer this challenge, consider two different employers, A and B.
Employer A decides that where two job seekers have equivalent relevant credentials, she
will favor the white job seeker. In adopting this policy, she makes a deliberate choice
that race will play a role in her employment decisions. B, by contrast, chooses the
candidate she thinks is best qualified. However, in a way of which she is not consciously
aware, she consistently devalues the accomplishments of non-white candidates.43 The
bias is small (which partly explains why it continues, unrecognized by B) so that it leads
to the same employees being selected over time as employer A chooses. In these cases, I
think it is fair to say that A intentionally uses race as a factor in decision making while B
does not. B is not even aware of the fact that race is relevant to his decision making
process and he surely has not adopted the preference for non-whites as a reason for
action. If, following Alexander, we say that the “real rule” in the case of employer A is
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For a complex and detailed account of how cognitive bias affects both perception and judgment, see
Krieger, supra note 5.
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“choose the best candidate, but in case of ties choose the non-white” because this is what
employer A intends, then what must we say about employer B? It seems we must say
that the “real rule” used by B is “choose the best candidate” – as that is what she intends.
Yet, that doesn’t seem right.
If one adopts the perspective of the people affected by each of these policies, it
seems clear that the real rule in both these cases uses race as a factor that counts against
the applicant. While we might blame the employer in case A and not in case B as the
actor’s intentions may be relevant to a judgment of the actor (about this issue I take no
stand), that doesn’t mean that the actor’s intentions determine what action the actor has
indeed taken. Both A and B use race in decision-making. In order to determine what the
real rule is we need to know whether race was a factor, not whether the employer
intended race to be a factor. Race was a factor for B as it was for A, notwithstanding the
lack of B’s intention to make it so.
This discussion helps illuminate what we might mean by the “real rule” – to use
Alexander’s locution. An approach that privileges intentions allows the actor’s conscious
choices to be determinative of the real rule. However, because the social meaning of an
actor’s action can be different from what she intends (discussed earlier) and because
cognitive bias can affect perception and judgment, what an actor intends often doesn’t
track what the actor does in fact. Therefore, the real rule refers to the factors that actually
affect the choice of job candidate – whether the actor intends them to do so or not.
Now of course there remains an important practical problem. How should a court
determine what the real rule is? How is anyone to know that race was a criterion in the
decision-making for both A and B since the criterion is private, even obscure to the
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person using it? The first thing to note about this issue is that it presents a question at the
level of doctrinal implementation not about what factors really matter to a determination
of what the real rule is. As the aim of this paper has been to argue against the claim that
intentions really matter, establishing this much is sufficient to the philosophical question
addressed here.
That said, let me offer some brief thoughts about the question of doctrinal
implementation. Someone might argue that a doctrinal approach that focuses on
intentions is the best approximation of the factors that really determine what the real rule
is – after all in many cases what that actor intends and what she does will be the same.
While this approach may initially seem plausible, I think it is far less so that it initially
seems. First, intentions themselves are non-public and thus difficult for a challenger to
establish. Therefore, this approach doesn’t even have the legal virtue of
administerability. Second, there are good reasons to think that the intended act and the
actual act will often come apart – either because cognitive bias is pervasive, as Linda
Hamilton Krieger persuasively argues,44 or because the social context in which people act
has a powerful impact on what that action actually is. Let me end with an example that
will illustrate this second point. If the governor of a southern state were to fly the
confederate flag over that state’s statehouse, the fact that he does so for good or at least
morally benign reasons is not enough to determine what he expresses in so doing. The
history of slavery, lynching and repression in the South – both before and after the Civil
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War – imbues that symbol with a meaning that this actor’s intentions cannot fully control.
The act has a meaning distinct from the speaker’s intended meaning.45

Part III: Is Invidious Intent Relevant to the Evaluation of Classifications?
In this section, we deal with the second sense of intention identified at the start of
the article. Recall, sometimes courts and commentators are interested in the question: on
the basis of what trait does the law or policy classify. The relevant intention thus relates
to that question: does the actor intend to classify on the basis of sex or veteran status, on
the basis of residency or race. Intention is relevant in this sense in order to define what
the law or policy to be evaluated actually is – thus Alexander’s talk of the “real rule.”
Alternatively, intention may be relevant to evaluate a law, policy or decision –
once it is defined. The actor’s aim in classifying as she does is the relevant intention
here. But still there is an ambiguity. Often a classification is used as proxy for another
trait, which I will call the “target.” We could say that the actor’s intention in classifying
on the basis of X trait is to identify people with Y trait (the target). The actor’s intention
then is to select people with the target, Y, trait. In addition, there is a reason that the
actor aims at Y. That reason could also be described at the aim of the actor. He intends
to classify on the basis of X trait, in order to pick out people with Y trait, for Z reason.46
For example, if a state law school adopts a regional preference in order to reduce the
45

This position is analogous to the view that a sentence or utterance has a meaning independent of the
speaker’s intended meaning. For an accessible overview of the distinction between speaker’s meaning and
sentence meaning, see Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PENN.
L. REV. 1363, 1374 (2000) (explaining that the “speaker’s meaning of a statement is (roughly) what the
speaker intended to communicate by her utterance of it; its sentence meaning is (roughly) what the
statement is conventionally uttered to communicate).
46
I explain the terminology “proxy,” “target” and “motive” in more depth in a previous article in which I
describe two forms of discriminatory laws – one’s that work by proxy and one’s that do not. See
Deborah Hellman, Two Types of Discrimination: The Familiar and the Forgotten, 86 CAL. L. REV. 315
(1998).
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number of black students admitted, in order to raise student performance, the school uses
the proxy “local” to aim at the target “non-black” because it wants to raise student
performance (the purpose or goal).47 If intention matters, is this because the intended
target matters48 or because the purpose or goal matters? Below, I will consider each in
turn.

Part III.A

The Target

In order to isolate whether aiming at a problematic target is relevant to whether a
law or policy is permissible, let’s begin with a case in which the law uses a benign proxy
to aim at a problematic target for a good (or at least permissible) reason. Alexander’s
regional law school provides an apt example. In that case, as you will recall, the school
authorities decide to adopt a regional preference in order to decrease the number of black
students admitted. This is the problematic target; local student is used as a proxy for the
target non-Black. The reason that motivates this decision however is benign. The school
has found (through the experience of a law school in a nearby state) that the LSAT overpredicts the performance of black students as compared to white students. Though these
facts present an unlikely scenario, it is a useful hypothetical to test our intuitions about
whether and how the use of a suspect target matters.
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The purpose or goal may be aimed at as a means toward another end as well. See Mitchell N. Berman,
Coercion Without Baselines, 90 GEO. L. J. 1, 24 (2001) (describing this relationship as “nested purposes”
and endorsing the view that a bad purpose “wherever a putatively bad purpose may lie within a chain of
nested purposes, the purposes animating state action, like its effects, constitute familiar respects in which
the Constitution can be violated”).
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When we focus on the target, this inquiry seems very close to the inquiry discussed in Part I. In this
Part, we are analyzing whether it matters that an actor uses a benign trait to target a suspect classification –
like race or sex. That is, we are assuming that is what the actor is aiming to do and asking whether that
intention ought to have legal significance. This inquiry is not the same as the inquiry into whether one
must consult intention in order to detect the case in which that actor uses a benign trait in order to target a
suspect class.
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If we are trying to assess whether the intention to exclude blacks matters to the
determination of whether the policy wrongful, we should first assume that the policy
doesn’t have its desired effects. Suppose, it is adopted for the reasons specified, but the
demographics of the two states are sufficiently different so that this regional policy does
not in fact have a negative impact on blacks. Here to hold that the proxy’s target renders
the law impermissible would seem to fetishize the purity of legislative motive. If we are
not in the business of judging the virtue of legislators or other policy makers, this
ineffectual attempt to exclude blacks seems irrelevant. More interesting and troubling is
a case in which the proxy does reach the desired target – fewer blacks are admitted. In
such a case, does the intent to raise student performance via reducing the number of
blacks matter to assessing the permissibility of this policy?
Alexander and Cole believe that intent is crucial in such a case because without
looking at intent we are unable to distinguish this policy from the benign adoption of a
local preference. In other words, Alexander and Cole believe that an intent standard is
required to support what they term the “anti-discrimination principle” by which they
mean the rule that some rational race and sex discrimination is forbidden.49 If one can
get around the prohibition on rational race and sex discrimination by substituting a close
proxy for race or sex, then the prohibition is useless, or so they argue. Thus, Alexander
and Cole thus argue that the intent principle “is necessary to prevent easy circumvention
of the Anti-Discrimination Principle.”50
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Alexander and Cole, supra note 38 at 453 (defining the anti-discrimination principle in the following
way: “Government cannot use racial classifications, even as the most cost-effective proxies for other traits,
unless using them as the most cost-effective proxies is necessary to further a compelling interest”).
50
Id. at 455.
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But is this right? The only way to know whether the school is classifying on the
basis of residency in order restrict the number of blacks (in order to raise student
performance) is to consult intentions. But this merely states the obvious. The only way
to know the school’s intentions is to look at the school’s intentions. As an argument for
why these intentions are relevant, it is a non-starter.
In order to begin to think about whether this intention ought to be relevant to the
permissibility of this policy, consider the following variation on Alexander’s example.
Suppose that the school adopts the preference for local applicants in order to enhance
student performance but without recognizing why this works. After the fact however,
studies demonstrate that the reason that the local preference enhances student
performance is because it lowers the number of minority candidates admitted which in
turn enhances student performance. Now what? Should the school repeal the policy? If
you are the school official responsible for deciding what to do, how should you think
about this question? If Alexander and Cole are correct that it is the intent to use locality
as a proxy for race that is problematic, then it would seem that the administrator need not
worry in this case. The policy of her school was adopted without this wrong-making
intention and so is not wrongful. Remember, I am not considering the issue of what sorts
of actions might make one vulnerable to suit in the real world or what prophylactic or
defensive actions might well be prudent. Rather, the aim of this article is to consider
when drawing distinctions among people is or is not wrongful.
Instead, and taking a page from Scanlon, the school administrator should think
about the question is this way: Is enhancing student performance an adequate reason to
prefer local applicants when this policy works by lowering the number of minority
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candidates admitted? Now of course, a school administrator who doesn’t know that the
policy works this way will only be able to ask herself the question: Is enhancing student
performance an adequate reason to prefer local applicants? Her lack of knowledge may
well be relevant to our assessment of praise or blame of her, but it is not relevant to our
assessment of the policy itself. If the policy works to enhance performance by limiting
minority enrollment, this is a feature of the policy that must figure in our assessment of
its permissibility whether it is known or intended by the actor or not. Thus, when this
fact comes to light, the administrator judging the permissibility of the policy ought not
consult her (or the school’s) intentions to determine whether she ought to repeal the
policy. Rather she ought to ask the first question posed above: Is enhancing student
performance an adequate reason to prefer local applicants when this policy works by
lowering the number of minority candidates admitted?
But isn’t it worse to do reduce minority enrollment deliberately? That depends
what we mean by “worse.” If the answer to the question above is that it is wrong to
enhance student performance via a local preference that lowers minority enrollment, then
to try to evade the law reveals something vicious in the character of the actor. She acts in
a way that shows she thinks she is above the law. However, if it is wrong to enhance
student performance via a local preference that lowers minority enrollment, then it is
wrong to do it unintentionally as well as intentionally – and neither action is worse than
the other. Similarly, it if is permissible to do so, then it is permissible to do so
intentionally.
Alexander and Cole fuse the questions of how we ought to judge the actor and the
action by using the term “circumvention.” It suggests the crafty evasion of the law that
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reveals something distasteful in the actor. If we are careful not to let this distaste for the
actor bleed into our judgment of the action, we can address the question of circumvention
more carefully. Whether or not the use of locality as a proxy for race as a proxy for
student performance is indeed a circumvention of the prohibition on rational race
discrimination (that is, on the use of race as a proxy for student performance directly)
depends on what it is exactly that is forbidden by a prohibition on rational race
discrimination.
At least two possibilities come to mind – each of which would have different
implications for the question whether the use of locality as a proxy for race as a proxy for
performance ought similarly to be forbidden. Before I discuss them, I want to pause to
emphasize that although this example and discussion focuses on rational race
discrimination, the same observations and inquiries would apply to rational sex, disability
or other forms of rational discrimination. For ease of exposition, I will focus on rational
race discrimination. The prohibition on rational race discrimination forbids generalizing
over race even when the generalization is supported by available data. Thus, though race
may be as good a proxy for a desired outcome (school or job performance, for example)
as other indicia like grades or experience, we forbid the use of race as a proxy in most
instances. In doing so, however, what exactly do we forbid. At least two possibilities
come to mind. Perhaps we forbid a) the use of race as a proxy to disadvantage or b) the
explicit or near explicit use of race as a proxy to disadvantage?
The choice of between these two conceptions of what rational race
discriminations forbids, (a) or (b), will depend on the reason why one believes rational
race discrimination itself ought to be forbidden. If the problem with rational race
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discrimination is that it tends to support and entrench the racial hierarchy of our society –
an anti-caste understanding of antidiscrimination norms51 – then the prohibition on
rational race discrimination forbids (a). If instead the problem with rational race
discrimination is that generalizing over race tends to reify racial categories or expresses
denigration of racial minorities,52 then the prohibition on rational race discrimination may
forbid something more narrow, something like (b). These are not meant to be exhaustive
formulations or explanations, just exemplary.
If the prohibition on rational race discrimination forbids (a), then the use of
locality as a proxy for race as a proxy for performance ought also to be forbidden.
Intending to use locality as a proxy for race in this way would indeed be an attempt to
circumvent the prohibition on rational race discrimination by carrying it out in a manner
that is hard to detect. But, it is not the intent to circumvent that makes it wrong. On this
understanding of what makes rational race discrimination wrong, the use of locality as a
proxy for race is wrong, whether it is intended or unintended.
On the other hand, if the prohibition on rational race discrimination forbids (b),
then the use of locality as a proxy for race as a proxy for performance is not wrongful. A
policy that privileges local applicants as a way to enhance student performance does not
express denigration of racial minorities or reify racial categories because race is not used
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See e.g. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107 (1976); Cass
R. Sunstein, The Anti-Caste Principle, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2410 (1994).
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Justice Thomas makes an argument along these lines in his opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in
part in Grutter:
The Constitution abhors classifications based on race … because every time the
government places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the provision of
burdens or benefits, it demeans us all. "Purchased at the price of immeasurable human
suffering, the equal protection principle reflects our Nation's understanding that such
classifications ultimately have a destructive impact on the individual and our society."
539 U.S. at 353-4 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (Thomas J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
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explicitly and because a local preference is not understood in a racialized manner. On
this understanding of what makes rational race discrimination wrong, enhancing student
performance is an adequate reason to prefer local applicants even when the policy works
by lowering the number of minority applicants.
Perhaps a few more examples will make the approach I endorse clearer.
Consider the practice of redlining, in which a mortgage lender refuses to lend money to
home-buyers in specific neighborhoods. Suppose that this practice increases loan
performance overall and does so because neighborhood is well-correlated with race
which, in turn, is correlated with loan performance. I do not mean to assert that these
correlations are accurate. Rather I use this example, and assume the truth of these
suppositions, because redlining is a familiar example about which people’s intuitions are
fairly clear. In rejecting an approach that makes the actor’s intentions relevant, I argue
that we need not ask whether the lender, in adopting the neighborhood exclusions,
intends to exclude buyers of color. Instead the relevant question is this: Is enhancing
loan performance an adequate reason to refuse loans to people buying houses in certain
neighborhoods when this practice succeeds in improving loan performance by limiting
the number loans offered to non-white home buyers? Using this approach, the moral
permissibility of redlining doesn’t depend on the actor’s intentions.
The objective approach I advocate here also does a better job of making sense of
the sort of case in which it is unlikely that the actor specifically intends the proxy/target
relationship that is supposed to be troubling. Consider exclusions of persons capable of
becoming pregnant. Suppose an employer were to exclude persons capable of becoming
pregnant from certain jobs because that trait (being capable of becoming pregnant) is well
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correlated with susceptibility to injury in the work place. If persons who are capable of
becoming pregnant are more likely than the average worker to be injured by the
hazardous work environment, or if injured more likely to suffer a serious injury
(miscarriage or impairment of the developing, fetus for example), then the proxy person
capable of becoming pregnant may well be correlated with the target likely to be injured
in the workplace. If we simply ask the question whether limiting the number and
seriousness of workplace injuries is a sufficient justification for refusing to hire persons
who are capable of becoming pregnant, we miss something important about this practice.
In truth, it is hard to really miss it as we can’t comprehend the classification person’s
capable of becoming pregnant without recognizing its overlap with the category women.
But if we could, if we could somehow see it as just that – person’s capable of becoming
pregnant – we would miss something that is relevant to its permissibility. What we ought
to ask, in considering its moral permissibility is this: Is limiting the number and
seriousness of workplace injuries a sufficient reason to refuse to hire persons capable of
becoming pregnant when that proxy works by excluding women? Whatever one’s
resolution of the question, the fact that it is women only who are capable of becoming
pregnant is surely a central factor. And what’s more: it is central whether or not the
employer enacted the pregnancy exclusion in order to target women (which it most likely
did not) or not.
To sum the conclusions of the argument of this section: the fact an actor
intentionally uses a trait in a law or policy as a proxy for another more suspect trait – like
race or sex – is not relevant to the moral permissibility of the law or policy. While it
surely matters that the policy is successful or efficient because the proxy trait works via a
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second proxy to reach its target, that fact is relevant whether it is intended or not. In
reviewing a law, policy or decision, we need not ask whether the actor had the right
intentions but instead whether the action is justified given the manner in which it
operates.

Part III.B

The Purpose

The second sense of intention that might be relevant to the evaluation of whether
a law, policy or decision constitutes wrongful discrimination is the purpose for which the
law or policy is adopted. In this section, we will examine whether the fact that a law or
policy is adopted for a bad reason is sufficient to render that law or policy impermissible.
“Purpose” is often used interchangeably with “motive.” By “purpose,” I mean the end at
which the actor aims. If intention is a function of the will – the actor’s purpose is the
goal she deliberately seeks. Motive, by contrast, relates to the reason that actually moves
the actor to act. The motive relates to what the actor desires rather than what she wills.
But I don’t want to make too much of that distinction here. The view I endorse in this
article is that the intentions of the actor – his consciously chosen ends – are not relevant
to the moral permissibility of classificatory acts. While I also believe that his motives –
the desire states that actually move him to action – are similarly irrelevant, I think that
claim will follow from the argument presented here. In passages from cases cited below,
these two terms – “purpose” and “motive” – are often used interchangeably and without
careful attention to whether it is what the actor wills or what the actor desires that is
thought to be central. As I want to argue that neither ought to be morally relevant to the
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evaluation of whether laws or policies wrongfully discriminate, I ask the reader to treat
them interchangeably in the passages below.
The view that a bad purpose is relevant to whether a law wrongfully discriminates
seems to be the claim underlying Justice Brennan’s statement in Moreno, cited at the
beginning of this article, that “if the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the
laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest.”53 This Equal Protection minimum is reiterated in Romer v. Evans.54 There the
Court explains that one of the reasons in support of holding Colorado’s Amendment Two
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause “is that laws of the kind now before us raise
the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the
class of persons affected.”55 The Court then goes on to cite the passage from Moreno
above. But is bad purpose or motive – a bare desire to harm –relevant to whether a
classification wrongfully discriminates or does it just seem so because the cases in which
it is cited are over-determined? In other words, other wrong-making features are also
present which confuse the issue.
In order to test the claim that invidious purpose or motive is relevant, we need to
look at cases in which that bad motive is not accompanied by other wrong-making
properties, else we won’t know if it is the motive that is really doing the work. Let’s
begin with a silly example. Suppose a school in the process of hiring teachers posts the
sign “No Martians need apply.”56 Putting aside issues of standing – are there any
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This example was suggested to me by Julia Driver.
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Martians to complain? – the School Board may intend to harm Martians. In that, they
reveal themselves to be crazy, but do they also act wrongfully? It seems that at least
something else is needed – either an effect or the expression of denigration.
More seriously, consider the following case. The orchestra of a large city is in the
process of hiring new musicians. The musical director aims to keep as many Asian and
Asian-Americans as possible out of the orchestra. Unfortunately for her, the orchestra
auditions musicians behind a screen, to protect against this and other kinds of bias. In
order to try to achieve her aim, the musical director picks musicians by counting passion
more than technique, an approach she believes (mistakenly) will screen out as many
Asian musicians as possible. As it turns out, the musical director bases her action on an
inaccurate generalization. Asian musicians are not less passionate and more technically
skilled than other musicians. As a result, the orchestra selected is one in which
passionate musicians outnumber highly technical ones, but has the same racial
composition (let us suppose) as would have been the case had the director adopted a
different hiring policy. Ought her bare desire to harm to invalidate the hiring procedure?
My intuition, which I hope is shared, is that it ought not. If the desire or motive
isn’t actualized in any way, it is hard to see what makes the action wrong – though the
desire surely reveals something unsavory about the musical director’s character. But
perhaps this is a bit too strong. There is something wrong about the actions of the
orchestra director and the School Board, but what I want to argue here is that if there is
something wrong about it, it is not the wrong of wrongful discrimination. Both the
orchestra director and the School Board are no doubt subject to standards of practice that
derive from their job descriptions – either explicitly or implicitly. The orchestra
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director’s job is to create the best orchestra, for example. If she also attempts to affect
the racial composition of the orchestra, her actions are outside of her role, are an abuse of
discretion, or something of that nature. This may well make her actions wrong, as
violations of her role obligation. But this is not the wrong of wrongful discrimination.
To see this point, we can imagine that the orchestra director was governed by no such
role obligations. If so, the hiring procedure described above would not be wrong.
If bad purpose or motive isn’t sufficient to render a law, policy or decision
wrongful, perhaps it is relevant nonetheless. Doesn’t a bad intention contribute to
making a classification wrongful discrimination? The sort of case that tests this issue is
one in which there is a bad intention and a bad effect but the effect, standing alone, would
not render the classification wrongful. For example, suppose an employer adopts a
policy of requiring employees to work 70-hours per week. Further suppose, not
unreasonably, that this policy has the effect of rendering the workforce almost all male.
Women, particularly women with children, are simply less willing to work the long hours
that the employer demands. Suppose you believe, which is itself contestable (but let’s
leave this issue out for the moment) that this policy does not wrongfully discriminate
against women or mothers. Does that judgment change if the employer adopts the policy
deliberately in order to keep women out of his employ? At least at first blush, it does
seem that this intention matters to our assessment of the wrongfulness of the policy. It
seems to turn a permissible or ambiguous case into an instance of wrongful
discrimination. Does this mean that the actor’s intention really is relevant?
It does not – not when we examine the case more closely. If a long hours policy
is permissible, despite its disproportionate negative effect on women, this must be
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because it has some beneficial effects as well – it’s efficient. But there are other policies
that the employer could adopt that would also produce efficiency, let’s say. This policy
is chosen both because of its effect on productivity and its effect on the gender
distribution of the work force. If there are several policies that would have increased
productivity in more or less the same amounts but this one was adopted because of its
gendered effects, then the employer really is using two criteria – sex and productivity – to
choose which work-place policy to adopt. In that sense, it is not merely that he wills or
wants fewer women, but that he chooses a policy of productivity/few women. It is not
just his intention; it is what he does.
If the distinction I am drawing seems elusive, consider the following example.
Suppose that an employer wishes to exclude Burmese employees. In order to do so, she
adopts a policy of refusing to hire workers with the last name “Burman” or “Berman” due
to the mistaken belief that all Burmese have last names of “Burman” or “Berman.”57
Suppose that the only two Burmese applicants happened to be women who had taken
their husband’s names and who were married to men with the last name Berman. In this
case, we have an intent to exclude Burmese workers and the effect of excluding Burmese
workers but we do not have a policy that discriminates on the basis of being Burmese.
In the long hours example, it made sense to say that sex was playing a role in the
choice of policies by the employer. It wasn’t just that he intended or wished that sex be a
factor, it was a factor in determining which productivity-enhancing policy he adopted.
Here by contrast, the employer wills or desires that ethnicity play a role in her hiring
decision, but it does not (except perhaps the excluding of Jewish employees as “Burman”
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and “Berman” may be predominantly Jewish surnames – but that’s not the issue we’re
considering). There is a coincidental effect of excluding Burmese job-seekers but we
can’t really say that the policy wrongfully excludes Burmese because we can’t really say
that the policy is one of excluding Burmese at all. The widely shared intuition that effect
alone ought not to be enough to constitute wrongful discrimination grows out of this sort
of fortuitous correlation between a policy and some consequence.
This argument harkens back to some of the discussion of Part II. Remember that
there I argued that in order to know what the actual rule, policy or classification is, we
may indeed have to go inside the head of the actor. So in cases of cognitive bias, race or
sex or some other trait really is playing a role in the decision or policy at issue,
notwithstanding the actor’s lack of intent to do so. Similarly, in the long hours example,
sex really is one of the job criteria. We do need to go inside the actor’s head to determine
this. But, and this is the key caveat, when we go inside, we do not look at what the actor
intends but rather look at what she does. What she wills or desires are not relevant. We
see that in the Burmese example. Even if the policy has the effect of excluding Burmese
applicants, if the policy really doesn’t exclude people on the basis of Burmese ancestry,
then this invidious intent and unfortunate effect do not render the policy wrongful.

Conclusion
When we imagine posing the question what makes classification wrongful to the
people affected by the laws, policies or decision at issue, we see that from their
perspective it makes sense to be concerned with how they are treated rather than with
passing judgment on state actors. To know how they are treated, we must focus on the
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objective features of the laws and policies that affect them, rather than on the subjective
intentions of the actors that adopt or enact these policies and laws. And Holmes would,
most likely, agree. At the end of Lecture I of the Common Law, titled “Early Forms
Liability,” in which the aphorism about dogs appears in the early part of his discussion,
Holmes has the following to say:
It remains to be proved that, while the terminology of morals is still
retained, and while the law does still and always, in a certain sense,
measure legal liability by moral standards, it nevertheless, by the very
necessity of its nature, is continually transmuting those moral standards
into external or objective ones, from which the actual guilt of the party
concerned is wholly eliminated.58
As the last part of his sentence makes clear, for Holmes, the “moral” refers to a judgment
about the “actual guilt of the party.” In other words, Holmes too thinks that we often
wrongfully confuse judgments about the moral character of the actor with judgments
about the moral permissibility of the action. In assessing the wrongfulness of
discrimination, it’s not the thought that counts.
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